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PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT:
AN ESSAY ON THE CURRENT STATUS
AND THE STAKES
John D. Donahue*
Is conventional public service being swept away by a tidal wave
of outsourcing? If replacement by private providers is eroding
public employment, how (if at all) should the interests of govern-
ment workers, and government employment as part of America's
social landscape, be considered as factors in the debate about
privatization? This essay engages these two questions-the first
with some specificity, the second far more tentatively.
Is PRIVATIZATION SHRINKING THE PUBLIC WORKFORCE?
The rhetoric of privatization opponents and enthusiasts alike
suggests a major siege on public employment as an institution.
Gerald W. McEntee and William Lucy of the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") warn of
a "coordinated campaign to privatize government at every level
[that] far exceeds anything we've seen in the past."1 At the other
end of the ideological spectrum, the Reason Public Policy Institute
declared triumphantly that "privatization moves ahead in breadth
and depth" and is "thriving in the United States."2 Such organiza-
tions issue regular publications packed with examples (which are,
respectively, denounced or celebrated) of services formerly pro-
vided by public workers being shifted to private delivery.
One might infer, from the volume and tenor of talk about priva-
tization, that American public employment (at least as we know it)
is on the verge of withering away. As a preliminary to any inquiry
into the effect of outsourcing on public employment, it is useful to
get a sense of the current status of the government workforce. The
question of whether public jobs are many or few turns out to be far
* Raymond Vernon Lecturer in Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment, Harvard University.
1. Statement by Gerald W. McEntee, International President & William Lucy,
International Secretary-Treasurer, American Federation of State, County, and Munic-
ipal Employees, Privatization: The Public Pays, http://www.afscme.org/private/
index.html.
2. Privatization 2000 (Reason Public Policy Institute ed. 2000), http://www.rppi.
org/privintro2000.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2001).
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more complex than is commonly supposed. The following section
calibrates the scale of public employment from several perspec-
tives, including relative to the past, scaled to the size of the popula-
tion and workforce, and relative to public spending.
As of 1999-the most recent year for which complete Census
Bureau data are available-there were roughly 20 million govern-
ment workers.3 Around 2.8 million of these were civilians working
for the federal government, of which the largest group (876 thou-
sand) consisted of postal workers, and the" second-largest (713
thousand) were civilians involved in national defense and interna-
tional affairs.4 The federal government also employed 1.4 million
uniformed military personnel.' The states, in the aggregate, em-
ployed somewhat more people than the federal government: 4.8
million overall, of which 2 million were involved in higher educa-
tion.6 The local government workforce exceeded federal and state
combined, at 10.7 million.7 More than half of these (5.7 million)
worked in primary and secondary education.8 The remaining 5
million local government workers were scattered across a score of
categories, with no single category except police services claiming
more than half a million.9
Is 20 million public workers a big or small number? An obvious
point of reference is the total count of American workers, which
was approximately 135 million at the end of 1999,10 making public
employment 15 percent of the total. But this is only useful for as-
sessing whether privatization is contributing to a downward spiral
of government employment by reference to the past. Figure 1
traces the number of government workers (on a full-time
equivalent basis) from 1948 to 1998. Public employment roughly
3. Different definitions yield somewhat different totals for the public workforce.
By some measures, the 1999 total was rather less than 20 million; by others, more than
21 million. GOVERNMENTS DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, 1999 U.S. CENSUS: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT By
FUNCTION: MARCH 1999 (2000), http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/99fedfun.txt.
4. Id.
5. For military statistics, see http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm.
6. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Employ-
ment Situation: January 2001 (Feb. 2, 2001) (referencing January 2000 seasonally ad-
justed total employment, which is considerably higher than the full-time equivalent
figures from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts, infra note 26), http://stats.bls.gov/bls-news/
archives/empsit-nr.htm.
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tripled over that half-century, but by no means smoothly. There
were sharp surges in net hiring (in the early 1950s, late 1960s, and
late 1980s) alternated with plateaus of little growth, and the public
payroll has been close to steady since around 1990. This simple
headcount of government workers, though, tells us little on its own.
FIGURE 1: FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT GOVERNMENT
WORKERS, 1948-9811
20000-
18000
16000
14000
12000
.~10000-
8 6000
[-
6000
4000
2000
0
0 1 . . . ? 
What about the scale of the public workforce relative to
America's population? Total government employment climbed
from about 6.5 percent of the population in the early 1960s to
around 8 percent by the late 1960s, and has stayed fairly close to
that level. From 1975 through 1999, public workers never ac-
counted for less than 7.7 percent of the population, and never ac-
counted for more than 8.2 percent, with no strong trend discernible
in the quarter century's data.' 2
Total population, however, may not be a particularly relevant de-
nominator. The population figures include many groups (such as
young children or undocumented aliens) the members of which are
not very likely to be employed by the government or a government
11. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME
AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, at tbl.6.5B, "Full-Time
Equivalent Employment by Industry," (various years) [hereinafter DOC SURVEY].
12. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FIS-
CAL YEAR 2001, at tbl.17.5, http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/hist.html#h17
[hereinafter 2001 BUDGET].
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contractor. A more germane point of reference is total employ-
ment. Figure 2 traces government employment relative to total em-
ployment, economy-wide, with both categories measured on a full-
time equivalent basis, with part-time workers counted in propor-
tion to their work hours. Two half-time teachers' aides, for exam-
ple, would count as one education worker on a full-time equivalent
basis. As noted earlier, the current share is around 15 percent, and
Figure 2 could be interpreted as tracing significant erosion of the
governmental workforce. Public employment's share of the total
was down by roughly a quarter from the peak of more than 20
percent it reached in the years just before and just after 1970. This
is consistent with downward pressure on the public workforce
caused by outsourcing and other forms of privatization. But a
closer look suggests a more complicated story. The public-sector
share of employment is lower than it was in the 1970s, but about
the same as it had been in the middle of the last century, suggesting
that the early 1970s (not the 1990s) may have been the aberration.
More tellingly, perhaps, is that more than half of the decline from
the peak occurred prior to the mid-1980s, when the privatization
debate first gained much prominence.
FIGURE 2: PUBLIC SECTOR AS SHARE OF U.S. FULL-TIME
EQUIVALENT EMPLOYMENT, 1948-9813
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13. DOC SURVEY, supra note 11, at tbl.6.5B.
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Unless privatization was a major force before it drew much atten-
tion (and far less influential as the debate grew noisier) it seems
unlikely that outsourcing explains much of the ebb in the public
share of the workforce.
Separating the governmental workforce into its major compo-
nents provides some additional perspective, at the expense of what
turns out to be inevitable complexity in the story of American pub-
lic employment. Public workers' total share of employment was
about the same at century's end as it had been fifty years earlier.
But its composition has changed radically. Figure 3 divides the
public workforce into four largely-exhaustive groups: the armed
services, other federal workers (including postal workers), state
and local workers involved in education, and all other state and
local workers. In 1948, these four groups were close to the same
size, each claiming between 3 and 4 percent of American employ-
ment. Over the next half-century, military employment dwindled
(for well-known and perfectly logical reasons). Other federal em-
ployment shrank as well, while state and local employment, both
education-related and not, surged as a share of the workforce.
There is a story to be told here,14 but it is not-at least not in any
obvious way-one of rampant outsourcing. Figure 3 underscores a
FIGURE 3: PUBLIC-SECTOR WORKFORCE AS SHARE OF U.S.
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYMENT, 1948-9815
14. See generally JOHN D. DONAHUE, DISUNITED STATES (1997).
15. DOC SURVEY, supra note 11, at tbl.6.5B.
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significant point: privatization decisions at the state and local level
will have a far larger impact on the big picture of American public
employment than will decisions at the federal level, where the
stakes are simply smaller.
Perhaps the more revealing comparison is not to population, or
total employment, but to the scale of the government's mission.
The public workforce can be called large or small, growing or
shrinking, only by reference to the amount of work the government
has to get done. If the headcount shrinks while the mission swells,
it is more plausible that the anecdotes of outsourcing do indeed
sum to a meaningful privatization trend.
Although government's share of America's gross domestic prod-
uct ("GDP") has varied rather less than one might infer from stri-
dent arguments about the size of government, it has risen and
fallen with changes in economic climate and political fashion. The
budgets of all levels of government combined climbed from
roughly one-quarter of GDP in the early 1960s to something over
30 percent in the mid-1970s, staying at or slightly above 30 percent
FIGURE 4: THOUSAND PUBLIC WORKERS PER ONE PERCENT OF
GDP SPENT BY GOVERNMENTS, 1962-9916
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16. See 2001 BUDGET, supra note 12, at tbls.15.5, 17.1, & 17.5.
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from 1980 through 1995, then declining somewhat to around 28
percent for the last half of the 1990s. 17 One intuitively appealing
measure of the public workforce is the number of government em-
ployees required for each 1 percent of GDP claimed for public
spending.' 8 If this number goes down government is accomplishing
its mission with fewer conventional employees, with one possible
cause (among others) being more aggressive outsourcing. Figure 4
tracks the trend in public workers relative to the public-sector
share of GDP from 1962 to 1999. The ratio of government employ-
ees to the government's share of GDP has actually risen by about
65 percent over the period.
Yet this seemingly straightforward ratio is misleading in at least
two ways-both serious, though in opposite directions of bias. One
distortion makes Figure 4 an overestimate of the ratio of public
work to public workers. Although the overall share of public
spending in the GDP has changed only modestly in recent decades,
the growth of federal transfer payments, mostly Social Security and
Medicare, masks the decline of governmental activities of the sort
that involve much actual service provision (as opposed to check-
writing). Ten billion dollars worth of transfer programs does not
imply the same demand for personnel as ten billion dollars' worth
of teaching, policing, or mine-inspecting. In 1962, Social Security
and Medicare payments accounted for 2.5 percent of GDP, and 10
percent of total public expenditures.' 9 In 1999, they claimed 6.5
percent of GDP, and more than 23 percent of public spending.20
These programs do not run themselves, to be sure; the Social Se-
curity Administration has about 63 thousand employees, and the
Health Care Financing Administration around five thousand. But
the disproportion between budget dollars and manpower for these
functions means that their growing share of public spending risks
distorting trends in the relationship between government's mission
and its workforce.
Figure 4 can be improved by removing Social Security and Medi-
care from the equation. Adjusting the spending figures is simple.
These transfer programs, which are reported separately by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget ("OMB"), simply are subtracted
from the public spending totals. Adjusting headcount is trickier.
OMB's figures combine Social Security Administration and Health
17. 2001 BUDGET, supra note 12, at tb1.15.3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at tbl.15.5.
20. Id.
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Care Financing Administration employees with all other workers
in the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") as well
as the Department of Education. Workers administering Social Se-
curity and Medicare comprise less than half of the HHS/Education
total. But for the sake of simplicity I subtract this whole category
of workers from the overall public workforce. This makes the ad-
justment between "with" and "without" transfer programs smaller
than it would otherwise be. But even so, the comparison is re-
markable. When Social Security and Medicare spending and per-
sonnel are excluded, the employment-to-spending ratio nearly
doubled.
FIGURE 5: THOUSAND PUBLIC WORKERS PER ONE PERCENT OF
GDP SPENT BY GOVERNMENTS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE EXCLUDED, 1962_9921
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Figure 5 shows that in 1999, close to 1 million workers were em-
ployed for every 1 percent of GDP in public spending (other than
the big transfer programs), up from just over 500 thousand in 1962.
By this measure, it seems as if the public workforce has grown, not
shrunk, relative to the scale of the mission.
The other distortion, tending to understate public-service auster-
ity, stems from the fact that "1 percent of GDP" is a shifting bench-
21. See 2001 BUDGET, supra note 12, at tbls.15.5, 17.1, & 17.5.
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mark. Public spending as a share of GDP was not all that different
in 1999 (28 percent) than it had been in 1962 (25.5 percent).22 But
although the share may be similar, at a bit more than one-quarter
of the economy, it was a bit more than one-quarter of a much
larger economy. In 1962, the GDP was about $2.6 trillion; in 1999
it was about $8.7 trillion, with both figures expressed in terms of
constant (1996) purchasing power.2 3 So each 1 percent of the econ-
omy was about 3.5 times as large, in real terms, in 1999 as in 1962.
Shouldn't public employment have grown at that pace? If so,
what looks like a rise in public employment is really a relative de-
cline, because government's similar share of a rapidly growing
economy should have produced a far greater enlargement of the
public payroll than has actually occurred. Adjusting for GDP
FIGURE 6: THOUSAND PUBLIC WORKERS PER ONE PERCENT OF
GDP OF PUBLIC SPENDING, ADJUSTED FOR GDP
GROWTH 1962-200024
AI11 Pubic Wokers and Spending - O ther than SS, Medicare
22. Id. at tbl.15.3. Excluding Social Security and Medicare makes the difference
even smaller, though in the other direction: 22 percent in 1999, down a little from 23
percent in 1962.
23. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT, at tbl.B-2 (Jan. 2001), http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/crp.html [here-
inafter ECONOMIC REPORT].
24. See 2001 BUDGET, supra note 12, at tbls.15.5, 17.1, & 17.5; ECONOMIC REPORT,
supra note 23.
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growth since 1962 does show a drop in the workers-to-work ratio,
both with and without transfer payments and their associated
workforce included. This is shown in Figure 6. The share is down
by more than half, relative to the 1962 benchmark, for the whole
public sector, and by nearly 43 percent excluding Social Security
and Medicare. Here, at last, we seem to have discovered the effect
of the privatization tidal wave on public employment-an army of
"missing" public workers. The American economy in 1999 was 3.5
times as large as it was in 1962, and government's share of the
economy was about a tenth higher-so why aren't there 46 million
public workers25 instead of 20 million? This finally must be the
smoking gun, betraying a shift toward private rather than public
workers to accomplish governmental tasks.
But this still doesn't seem quite right. America's overall
workforce only doubled (from 58 million to 119 million, on a full-
time equivalent basis) between 1962 and 1998, while the economy
more than tripled in size.26 That is what productivity growth is all
about. The number of non-governmental workers for each 1 per-
cent of the GDP outside government also dropped sharply over
this period, when measured by the same yardstick, though the de-
cline is slightly steeper for public workers. It would have been re-
markable (and regrettable) had government missed out on this
economy-wide gain in the ability to do more with less. 27 And the
largest share of the drop (relative to the "shadow" public service
one might have expected with a constant ratio of staff to spending)
occurred prior to the early 1980s, when privatization first gained
much prominence as a strategy for public-sector reform.
What inferences can we draw from these aggregate public-em-
ployment data? Growth in overall public employment did indeed
slacken in the 1990s (as talk of privatization intensified), but the
government payroll did not shrink. Public employment has de-
clined only modestly (when scaled to the nation's population or the
overall workforce) during the two decades or so of privatization's
vogue, and other reform themes were at work as well. The
25. This projection is made by multiplying the number of public workers in 1962
(11.9 million) by 3.5 and again by 1.1.
26. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME
AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, IN CURRENT DOLLARS AND
CHAINED (1996) DOLLARS, http://www.bea.doc.gov/dn/gdplev.htm.
27. Or, to be precise, to do more with less labor. The matter is actually rather
more complex than this. Many large categories of public-sector tasks-teaching, for
example-are probably less subject to large improvements in labor productivity than
the average for the private economy.
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workforce has grown, not shrunk, relative to the public-sector
share of GDP, but recognizing that the underlying GDP has grown
even faster suggests some erosion relative to what might have been
had the public sector of 1999 been simply a scaled-up version of the
public sector of 1962. Yet productivity growth is almost surely the
main factor behind this reduction in the workers-to-work ratio.
Instead of relying on fuzzy inferences from aggregate data, why
not get a precise fix on privatization's impact on the public
workforce by simply comparing trends in actual spending on tradi-
tional versus privatized government spending?28 This seems emi-
nently sensible, but is unfortunately impossible. No such spending
data exist. Although anecdotes and special-purpose statistical tal-
lies issued by privatization's friends or foes can be invoked to
demonstrate a surge in the private performance of public functions
there is no clear-cut definition of privatization, and no standard
measuring stick. But for present purposes, a rough definition
might be publicly-funded services that are not performed by public
employees.
The best available gauge for the progress of privatization, by this
admittedly coarse definition, comes from the voluminous National
Income and Product Accounts ("NIPA") compiled and distributed
by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic
Analysis.29 These accounts disaggregate annual public spending
along several dimensions. One dimension is the level of govern-
ment-state and local versus federal and, within federal, national
defense and international versus domestic programs. Within each
of these categories, spending is further separated into transfer pay-
ments like Social Security or (at the state and local level) general
assistance, debt service, grants to other governments, and invest-
ment in structures and equipment. The remainder includes a large
category somewhat confusingly labeled "consumption," which is
essentially payments made to suppliers of goods and services. At a
very high level of aggregation (and with a correspondingly low
level of precision) the answer to the question "how much privatiza-
tion?" can be sought here.
The entire U.S. public sector spent roughly $1 trillion on services
in 2000. About $885 billion of this went to pay the salaries and
28. See generally Paul Light, The True Size of Government (1999) (discussing
privatization in the federal government).
29. See generally BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GDP
AND OTHER MAJOR NIPA SERIES TABLES: 1929-99; 1946:1 THROUGH 2000:1, http://
www/bea/doc/gov/bea/dn/st-tabs.htm.
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benefits of government workers ($232 billion federal, $653 billion
state and local), and about $169 billion went for "other services,"
which is a rough proxy for outsourced tasks.30 In other words, ser-
vices delivered by people other than public employees accounted
for about 16 percent of the public sector's overall service budget.
Once more the question arises: is this a big number, or a small
number? Figure 7 tracks "other services" as a fraction of total ser-
vice spending, separating federal from state and local data, and
suggests two strong and perhaps surprising conclusions. First, non-
employee services account for a vastly larger share of federal than
of state and local service spending. Second, the last decade of the
twentieth century-a time marked by a great deal of talk about
privatization, whether mournful or triumphant-displays essen-
tially no trend at all on the mix between employee and non-em-
ployee service spending. At the federal level, the non-employee
share goes up by a bit, then down by a bit more. At the state and
FIGURE 7: NON-EMPLOYEE SERVICES AS SHARE OF TOTAL
SERVICES, 1990200031
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30. It is unclear exactly how rough this proxy is; a research effort in progress is
examining this question.
31. DOC SURVEY, supra note 11, at tbl.3.7, "Government Consumption
Expenditures and Gross Fixed Investment by Type."
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local level, it goes up by a bit, then down by about the same
amount. Closer analysis may unveil some hidden pattern, but on
the surface (with the possible exception of the federal decline to-
ward the end of the period) this looks like random variation
around a fairly steady balance of in-house versus outsourced public
service.
In sum, there is little reason to believe that contracting out has
been responsible for any major erosion in the public-sector
workforce over the past decade. There has very likely been some
effect. We need not systematically suspect the accuracy of the vo-
luminous anecdotal record. But we can question whether that re-
cord is representative of what has been happening in the structure
of American public service delivery. Aside from the general
human tendency to over-generalize from anecdotes, the wide-
spread perception of a big effect from privatization is likely shaped
by the incentives of both advocates and adversaries to exaggerate
the impact to date. Privatization almost surely has had a smaller
influence on the size of the public workforce than have shifts in the
size and composition of government's mission,32 productivity
growth, and simple austerity. Far from cutting to the heart of pub-
lic employment, privatization seems to have been (at least so far)
nibbling around the edges. This, of course, could change.
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
It may be that the pattern suggested by the data cited above-a
modest effect from privatization on the size of the public
workforce-represents an equilibrium: those functions suited to
privatization already have been outsourced, and any remaining
changes will be marginal. Here is not the place to discuss the crite-
ria that make a public task more or less suitable to private deliv-
ery.33 It could turn out that very few incremental public functions
will prove suitable to privatization, when honestly assessed by cri-
teria other than the impact on public employees. Public-worker un-
ions and other privatization opponents argue that this is nearly
always the case, and it is eminently understandable why they take
this line of argument.34
32. I recognize that this may itself be included in a broad definition of
"privatization."
33. See generally JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989).
34. See Press Release, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Em-
ployees, AFSCME Applauds Secretary Mineta on Opposing Privatization of FAA
(Mar. 15, 2001) (praising decision not to "spin off some Federal Aviation Administra-
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If potential reassignments of public responsibilities that threaten
government workers are also consistently bad for the citizenry as a
whole, the rest of this essay will be rather pointless. But suppose
there are important examples of services currently performed by
government employees in which the evidence and arguments point
to real advantages (in terms of cost reduction, quality improve-
ments, greater flexibility, and so on) from privatization, but at the
price of a shrunken public payroll. In the quite likely event that
this is not a negligible category of privatization decisions, we need
to determine whether, and how, the public workforce should weigh
in the balance.
This is only an important issue to the extent there is something
distinctive about government employment.35 If public-sector jobs
differ in no important respect from private-sector jobs, the public
workforce would be a minor factor in privatization decisions,
whatever portfolio of values one brings to the issue. But govern-
FIGURE 8: AVERAGE WAGE/SALARY PER FULL-TIME
EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEE, 1948-9836
Government/private sector --- (- Federal civilian/peivate sector
--- 0--- State and local/private sector Eduationpnvatc
tion (FAA) functions to the private sector and deciding to instead concentrate on
making improvements to the agency"), http://www.afscme.org/press/prl0315.htm.
35. I note that I have been a government worker on three occasions, summing to
roughly a quarter of my career.
36. DOC SURVEY, supra note 11, at tbls.6.5B, 6.6C.
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ment work is different-in subtle ways that space does not permit
me to explore here, but also in some quite straightforward ways.
FIGURE 9: COMPENSATION FOR ALL FULL-TIME
WORKERS, 199817
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First, government jobs tend to be well-compensated. This was
not always the case. In the early post-war years, compensation per
employee tended to be somewhat lower in government than in the
private economy. But as Figure 8 shows, average compensation in
government at all levels outpaced private-sector compensation
starting in the 1970s, and even after a recent downturn is still about
8 percent above the non-governmental benchmark .38 Figure 8-
based on National Income and Product Account data-is at an ex-
tremely high level of aggregation, covering only broad classes of
workers. Somewhat more fine-grained data are available from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' periodic National Compensation Sur-
vey ("NCS"), which records hourly wages (or the annual salarye-
37. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NATIONAL
COMPENSATION SURVEY, OCCUPATIONAL WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998,
Supplemental Tables, at tbl.2.1, 3.1 (2000). Compensation defined as straight-time
hourly wage or the equivalent in annual salary, and excludes overtime premia,
bonuses, and vacation pay.
38. This reflects changes in both the composition of public employment, and com-
pensation levels for any given category of workers.
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quivalent) for many categories of workers, both private sector and
in state and local government.39
Figure 9, based on the most recent (1998) NCS data, shows that
public-sector pay is higher not just at the median and at the 1st
decile level-which is consistent with the conventional wisdom of
more compressed public payscales-but at the 9th decile level as
well. In other words, both at the low end and at the high end,
public workers earn more than private workers. This general pat-
tern holds for both broad categories like white-collar and blue-col-
lar workers, and for many narrower categories, including janitors,
bus drivers, auto mechanics, and secondary-school teachers. It is
only in a few especially high-paying occupations-such as lawyers,
physicians, and computer analysts-that this pattern is reversed.
At the very high end, to be sure, private-sector compensation
vastly outpaces government. (The tendency of those who discuss
relative payscales to be in high-end managerial and academic occu-
pations may explain the prevalence of confusion about low-paying
government work. If you are an attorney or a financial analyst, or
if you teach attorneys or financial analysts, low pay is a central fea-
ture of government work. But the picture is quite different viewed
from other occupational vantage points.)
Government workers also tend to be much older than private-
sector workers. 40 Figure 10 shows that fewer than than one-third of
the private workforce was forty-five years old or older in 1999,
compared to something approaching one-half of public workers.
This has something to do with the surge in government hiring in
the 1970s, something to do with the characteristics of many govern-
mental tasks, and something to do with differences in turnover be-
tween government and business. But the age distribution of
government as a whole is strongly skewed toward older workers,
and in some sub-categories this tilt is dramatic. For example, over
three-fourths of the nearly 10,000 employees of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development are older than forty, and 41 per-
cent are older than fifty.41
39. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NATIONAL COMPEN-
SATION SURVEY: OCCUPATIONAL WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998 (2000), availa-
ble at http://stats.bls.gov/special.request/ocwc/och/ncsocs/ncs/ncbllOl74.xls.
40. This is, of course, related in several ways to the pay differential between the
two sectors.
41. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE FEDERAL
WORKFORCE, SEPT. 30, 1998, http://www.opm.gov/feddata/demograp/demograp.htm.
These calculations are derived from on-line data accessed in August 2000.
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FIGURE 10: AGE DISTRIBUTION, WAGE AND SALARY
WORKERS, 199942
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E3 Private Non-Agricuhml O" Government
There is another well-known distinction of public employment,
though its magnitude often is underestimated: The public
workforce is far more unionized than the private workforce (see
Figure 11). A government worker is more than four times as likely
to be a union member than is a private-sector worker, and the
most-organized segment of the private sector (transportation and
communications) is much less heavily unionized than the least-or-
ganized segment of the public sector (the federal government).
42. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, ANNUAL AVERAGES, at tbl.15,
"Employed persons in agriculture and nonagricultural industries by age, sex, and class
of worker."
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FIGURE 11: UNIONIZATION RATE, 20003
ALL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES I
Local Government 2 '. . . . . . . . . .
State Government i ____ I
Federal Government
ALL PRIVATE EMPLOYEES.
Services f
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transportatlon end Utilities .
Manufacturing
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Other distinctive features of public employment could be dis-
cussed, but the bare facts summarized here are sufficient to render
plausible the idea that a major shift toward outsourcing would
whittle down the wage premium enjoyed by some current workers,
shrink the number of less-skilled jobs paying middle-class salaries,
have a disproportionate impact on older workers, and lay siege to
the remaining stronghold of the labor movement. 4 It is clear how
one should regard this prospect if one is an AFSCME official. It is
equally clear how one should regard this prospect if one is a Rea-
son Foundation official. But what about the rest of us?
Consider first one tidily pure position: the interests of public
workers, and the idea of public employment, should have no inde-
pendent standing whatever. The guiding principle of our capitalist
economy is that you face merciless competition as a supplier, and
are compensated with a rich menu of low-cost options as a con-
sumer. 45 That principle suggests that if public employment turns
43. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL UNION
MEMBER SURVEY: UNION MEMBERS AS SHARE OF WORKFORCE (Jan. 2001), http://
stats.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm.
44. Alternative scenarios are by no means ruled out, but grant, for the sake of
argument, that this would be the central thrust.
45. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, THE FUTURE OF SUCCESS (2000) (providing a
thoughtful take on this much-discussed theme).
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out to be the most efficient, most accountable way to organize the
production of postal services, or welfare-to-work counseling, or
primary and secondary education, fine. If not, then turn to the pri-
vate sector-and if public employment drops from 15 percent of
the total to 10, or 5, or zero, so be it.
Many observers (and not just public workers or their unions) are
likely to feel uncomfortable with that pure position. Rampant
privatization very likely would increase the economic inequality
that already is plaguing America. It undercuts the function of pub-
lic employment as the pace-setter and benchmark for civilized em-
ployment practices, including (not least importantly) racial and
gender equity. It seems rather brutal toward a large number of
people who have made irreversible career investments in public
service. And it would trigger an acrimonious political battle only
faintly presaged by the limited privatization we have seen so far.
Consider next the other extreme: if a given candidate for priva-
tization would damage the interest of public workers or seriously
shrink the government workforce it should be rejected even if it
credibly promises to lower costs, or improve accountability, or
boost performance. This is also likely to be less than satisfying to
many Americans (and not just free-market fundamentalists or as-
piring government contractors). It would be logically consistent, at
least, to revisit our basic capitalist bargain and say producers' inter-
ests should trump consumers' economy-wide, and that government
should do a great many things so that there will be a large number
of good government jobs. That experiment has been run elsewhere
on the planet, however, and few were persuaded by the results. To
declare that those people who happen currently to be employed by
the government have rights to good, secure jobs that other workers
lack, alternatively, is less radical, but ethically random beyond de-
fense.46 Even if this could be squared on the moral front, it seems
politically hazardous. Unless privatization is always and every-
where a bad idea from the perspective of citizens overall, making
public employment a trump implies requiring 85 percent of Ameri-
cans to pay more or get less than they otherwise could, so that 15
percent of Americans can have differentially favorable conditions
of employment. This seems quite likely to breed public hostility
toward government.
46. Perhaps it would not be entirely beyond defense, if favored government work
is restricted to workers who for some valid reason are considered particularly
deserving.
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For those troubled by both pure approaches, are there more ten-
able intermediate positions between treating public workers' stakes
as dispositive, and ignoring them altogether? Mapping the middle
ground is likely to be an extensive undertaking only begun here.
Whether it warrants the effort will depend on how rapidly the list
of otherwise attractive privatization candidates lengthens. Here, I
merely underscore the likelihood that we will confront at least
some significant instances in which the institution of public em-
ployment and the interests of specific public workers will be at
odds with other considerations in decisions about the privatization
of traditional governmental functions. And I offer three observa-
tions that may render the debate over public employment and
privatization marginally clearer and more productive.
The first observation is essentially analytical. We should be dis-
ciplined about distinguishing between the efficiency effects and the
distributional effects of specific privatization proposals. Cost sav-
ings from outsourcing can be due to real productivity advantages-
a more rational scale of operations; management structures and
strategies better suited to the task; a superior technical approach,
and so on-or to driving a harder bargain with employees through
bypassing public sector labor provisions. Both of these things can
and do occur. The two sources of savings-real efficiency gains,
and losses to employees-often are commingled in the same re-
structuring, and both show up as simply "lower costs." The distinc-
tion is real enough in an economic sense, and a potent political
motivator, but disappears in the accounting.
It is worth disentangling the two in the analysis of specific priva-
tization decisions, and distinguishing between them in public
presentations of the policy choice. Savings due to dismantling rela-
tively generous public employment practices essentially shift re-
sources from citizens-as-producers to citizens-as consumers, which
is fundamentally different from doing more with less. Virtually
everyone favors the latter effect. Many may favor the former as
well, while others may oppose it. But an informed public delibera-
tion over the virtues and drawbacks of privatization requires that
citizens be able to tell them apart. At present, both sides in the
privatization debate tend to see advantages in obscuring the differ-
ence, which makes it difficult for citizens to deal honestly with the
stakes of the choice.
The second observation is operational, and related to the first.
The best candidates for privatization are those that promise large
efficiency advantages relative to the labor disruption they impose.
1712
20011 PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 1713
Whatever judgement one reaches about the validity of public
workers' stakes, it is worth minimizing the losses inflicted on cur-
rent government employees. This is true whether one believes
public workers' stakes to be legitimate and those losses lamentable,
or whether one simply would like to minimize the political effort
required to exploit private efficiency advantages. In practice, this
implies a relative bias, other things being equal, toward outsourc-
ing in new services (where there are few existing interests to dis-
rupt), or in areas in which private-sector conditions of employment
are not markedly inferior to government, or in which the public
workforce already is shrinking through attrition or retirement.47
The third observation is considerably broader. The more turbu-
lent aspects of the debate over privatization policy reflect a sub-
merged debate about labor policy. What makes outsourcing
particularly contentious in the United States is the widening gap
between conditions of employment in the public and private sec-
tors. In Northern European nations, for example, where the differ-
ence between public and private labor conditions is generally
minor, outsourcing is more often seen as a technical issue with lim-
ited political voltage. In this country, we are awkwardly cramming
a conversation about compensation, job security, and labor rights
into a conversation about what government should do directly, and
what it should delegate to outside organizations.
The American labor movement is reinforcing its stronghold in
the public sector as its private-sector presence dwindles and em-
ployment practices tilt toward laissez-faire. This strategy may be
understandable, but it is probably not sustainable. We eventually
will have to confront the disconnect between the conditions of em-
ployment characteristic of government, and the increasingly mar-
ket-driven environment of private-sector employment. Some will
prefer to level toward the private-sector model, dismantling gov-
ernmental labor protections and creating more room for both risk
and reward in the public sector. Others will prefer to level toward
the governmental model, shoring up bulwarks of labor protection
that have eroded over recent decades. But so long as labor policy
remains the tacit subtext of the debate, it will remain difficult to
think clearly about privatization per se.
47. I recognize that this skirts the issue of whether there is value in public employ-
ment separable from the interests of specific, current workers. Public employee un-
ions would take limited comfort from this guideline.
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